Tradeoffs I chose
- No forward secrecy for album content. Members keep every epoch key so they can open old photos. Anyone who fully compromises a member's phone can open everything that member could.
- No automatic recovery after a compromise. There is no ratchet that heals over time. Recovering means removing the affected member, which starts a new epoch.
- Removal only protects the future. Miuchio deletes the album from a removed member's phone when it learns of the removal, but it cannot take back screenshots, copies saved outside the app, or keys and photos kept by a modified app.
- New members see the whole history. An invite delivers every earlier epoch key. There is no option to join without history.
- One admin per album. Only the admin can invite, remove and vouch for members. The admin can hand the album over, but there are no co-admins.
- Uploads can pause after someone leaves. The first remaining phone to come online makes the new key, usually within seconds. If no remaining phone can confirm every member's key, uploads stay paused until the members compare security codes.
What a malicious server could still attempt
The server cannot decrypt photos or keys. It is still trusted with things encryption does not cover:
- Substitute a key at first contact. Pinning catches later changes, but the first key seen is trusted. Comparing safety numbers is the defence. See Trust and verification.
- Substitute a key during an invite. The album keys are wrapped to the key in the fetched bundle before any earlier pin is compared, and the server decides whether the invitee is new or returning, so a substituted key receives them. A later warning cannot take them back. See Trust and verification.
- Show members different versions of a key change. Members verify their own wrap, but not the signed list of everyone who received the key.
- Lie about who is a member right now. Phones check member notes and handovers themselves, but take the server's word for the current members. It could accept a new epoch from someone who left but still holds an old note, or hide a handover from a phone. See Handing an album over.
- Hide, reorder or replay photo records. There is no signed list of an album's photos yet.
- Misreport who uploaded a photo. Uploader identity is recorded by the server, not signed by the uploader.
- Refuse service. It can delete data, withhold it or stop responding. Encryption does not provide availability.
What the server can see
| Information | Visible to the running server? | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Photo contents, album titles, member names, profile photos | No | Encrypted on the phone |
| Your email address | At sign in, or when asking to delete your account | Passed to the email provider to send the code. The database stores only an HMAC |
| Which albums you are in, and your role | Yes | A database copy does not name you, but it shows which memberships belong to the same person. See Metadata and the social graph |
| Who signed an epoch change or a key delivery | Yes | Even a database copy shows it, by checking signatures against stored public keys |
| Which account each membership belongs to | Yes | A database copy can match the public keys in each member note to an account. See Metadata and the social graph |
| Number, size and timing of uploads | Yes | Sizes are exact; padding is not built |
| When membership and keys change | Yes | Default timestamps are stored rounded to the hour; revocations and key receipts are exact |
| Your network address and when you are connected | Yes | Inherent to talking to a server |
Work that is not finished
- Members cannot yet verify the signature over a whole epoch change.
- There is no signed history of who joined and left an album.
- There is no signed list of an album's photos.
- There is no backup and no multi-device support yet. The server will not accept a new identity key for an existing account, so a reinstalled app cannot take over that account's albums.
- Used one-time prekey private keys are not yet deleted from the phone.
- Encrypted file sizes are not padded.
- A person's memberships share one handle across albums. A separate handle per album is planned; see Metadata and the social graph.
- There is no post-quantum key agreement.
- The design and code have not had an independent security review.